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Abstract 
Coupled with advances in enterprise reform and changes in the wage structure, earnings 
inequality in urban China has been increasing, and this has contributed significantly to rising 
income inequality. Using urban household survey data from the 1988, 1995 and 2002 waves 
of the China Household Income Project, in this paper, we decompose earnings inequality in 
urban China by using the regression-based decomposition methods developed by Fields 
(1998), Morduch and Sicular (2002) and Shorrocks (1999). The decomposition results 
indicate that the effects of gender and membership of the Communist Party of China on 
earnings inequality have changed little. While work experience had a reduced effect on 
earnings inequality, the effects of education and occupation have increased. The contributions 
of ownership status and industry to earnings inequality have increased. Regional effects have 
been the largest recent contributor to earnings inequality. 
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1. Introduction 
Rising earnings inequality in urban China, as one of many sources of widening income 
inequality, has drawn increasing attention. With the privatization of state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs), the development of private firms and the self-employment sector and the reform of 
wage systems, urban earnings inequality has been increasing since the mid-1990s, and this 
has led to rising income inequality within urban China (Gustafsson and Li, 2001; Khan and 
Riskin, 2005; Knight and Song, 2008). Our estimation results indicate that the Gini coefficient 
of earnings in urban China rose from 0.235 in 1988 to 0.302 in 1995, and then to 0.342 in 
2002. Rising earnings inequality is partly caused by the introduction of market forces to wage 
determination, which provides stronger incentives to workers and greatly enhances efficiency. 
It also results from economic restructuring and labor market segmentation. In this paper, we 
aim to determine the driving forces behind rising earnings inequality in urban China and to 
quantify the relative effects of these forces. 
In a planned economy, the main determinant of wage levels is seniority, which almost 
completely explains wage inequality (Knight and Song, 1994). By contrast, under the current 
wage scheme, the driving forces of wage differentials have diversified and are constantly 
changing. As indicated by previous studies, education, rather than work experience, has 
become the most important determinant of urban wages in China (Knight and Song, 2008). 
Moreover, institutional segmentation in the labor market, such as that based on industry, 
region, and ownership, has increased in the process of marketization and plays an important 
role in wage determination (Démurger et al., 2006). To evaluate the relative importance of 
each factor in wage determination, the conventional approach is to estimate earnings 
functions, from which one can gauge the average and marginal effects of different factors on 
wage levels. However, using this approach does not fully account for wage inequality among 
urban workers. Thus, researchers have used decomposition of the Gini coefficient by income 
sources or decomposition of the Theil indices by population groups.
1 Useful as they are, these 
two decomposition approaches have limitations, which have been overcome by recently 
developed regression-based decomposition approaches. In this paper, based on estimated 
earnings functions, the approaches developed by Fields (1998), Morduch and Sicular (2002) 
                                                 
1 For an example of the use of these two decomposition methods, see Gustafsson and Li (2001), who examine 
the change in earnings inequality in urban China from 1988 to 1995. 
  2and Shorrocks (1999) are employed to disentangle the effects of causal factors on earnings 
inequality in urban China. 
This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we describe the institutional 
background behind the changes in urban earnings inequality and present a brief literature 
review. In Section 3, we discuss regression-based decomposition approaches. In Section 4, we 
describe the data used, and we present descriptive statistics and decompositions of earnings 
inequality by source. In Section 5, we estimate linear and logarithmic earnings functions. In 
Section 6, we present decompositions of several inequality indices of earnings based on our 
regression results. In Section 7, we present conclusions and discuss policy implications. 
 
2. Institutional Background and Related Literature 
Rising earnings inequality is linked to enterprise reforms, changes in wage 
determination and the market allocation of labor. In the early period of reform in the late 
1970s, the overwhelming majority of enterprises were publicly owned. Wage levels in SOEs 
and collective enterprises were set by the government and were based essentially on factors 
such as education, seniority and occupation (Li and Zhao, 2003). As well as wages, workers 
in SOEs were provided with welfare in the form of, for example, subsidized housing and 
public medical care. The profitability of enterprises and workers’ labor input and productivity 
did not affect individual wages. Thus, distributions of wages and earnings were fairly equal 
under the old system (Knight and Song, 2003). 
With the process of economic reform and the opening of the economy, the ownership of 
urban enterprises became more diversified. Foreign, private and individually owned 
enterprises thrived, which helped to absorb surplus labor and the unemployed. Earnings 
schemes in non-state-owned enterprises were more market oriented. Hiring decisions and 
wage setting were determined by enterprises according to worker productivity. 
At the same time, enterprise reforms were ongoing within SOEs, which were granted 
more autonomy in hiring and firing workers and were allowed to reallocate labor to improve 
efficiency. The wage system of SOEs was also reformed based on hardening budget 
constraints. Moreover, workers’ earnings became better aligned with efficiency, and human 
capital formation based on education was better rewarded (Meng and Kidd, 1997). 
The reforms in SOEs and the development of non-state-owned enterprises increased 
marketization in the allocation of labor. Large-scale layoffs in the late 1990s intensified the 
  3reallocation of labor.
1 According to the National Bureau of Statistics (2005), the number of 
workers in the state-owned sector as a percentage of all workers in urban China fell from 
78.32 in 1978 to 25.34 in 2004 (see Figure 1).
2 
Has economic reform affected the earnings distribution in urban China? To what extent 
are personal and employment characteristics correlated with earnings inequality? To address 
these interesting questions, researchers have examined the distribution of earnings from 
several perspectives. Undoubtedly, the gender earnings gap is a matter of concern. As 
expected, the gender gap in earnings increased following the dismantling of the planned 
economy, which compressed earnings (Démurger et al., 2007). Gustafsson and Li (2000) find 
that the earnings differential between male and female workers increased between 1988 and 
1995. However, in the same period, the gender earnings differential that could not be 
explained by differences in characteristics increased from 52.5% to 58.9%. Liu et al. (2008) 
examine gender earnings differentials in SOEs and collective, private and individually owned 
enterprises and suggest that human capital is better rewarded in more market-oriented 
enterprises, which has raised gender earnings differentials. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
As a substantial component of human capital, education has strong explanatory power 
for earnings. Returns to education in urban China increased from 3.8% in 1988 to 5.7% in 
1995 and then to 8.1% in 1999 (Li and Lee, 1993; Lai, 1999; Li and Ding, 2003).
3 Returns to 
education also increase with education levels. For instance, people with tertiary education 
have a higher return per education year than do those with secondary education. Another 
important component of human capital is work experience. This affects earnings through two 
channels in the Chinese context: the cultural heritage of respecting seniority and an increase 
in the stock of skills through learning-by-doing. It has been shown that the earnings of SOE 
workers increased with experience between 1981 and 1987 (Meng and Kidd, 1997). However, 
a recent study indicates that the relationship between earnings and work experience weakened 
from the mid-1990s (Knight and Song, 2008). Occupation and membership of the Communist 
Party of China (CPC) also significantly affect earnings. Cadres, professionals and skilled 
workers have higher wages than do unskilled workers (Knight and Song, 2003; Yueh, 2004). 
                                                 
1 Knight and Yueh (2006) investigate voluntary and involuntary mobility of urban workers in the process of 
labor market reform. 
2 The state-owned sector includes SOEs, governments and institutions. 
3 Zhang and Zhao (2002) obtained higher estimates of the return to education of 4.7%, 7.7% and 11.5% in 1988, 
1995 and 1999, respectively. 
  4The mean earnings of workers with CPC membership were 24% and 17% higher than those 
of their non-CPC counterparts in 1995 and 1999, respectively. These differentials reflect both 
differences in the human capital of CPC and non-CPC workers and the preferential treatment 
enjoyed by CPC workers (Knight and Song, 2003). 
Earnings are also correlated with variables such as ownership, industry and region, the 
effects of which reflect the extent of segregation of the labor market. If the labor market is 
fully competitive, workers with the same level of human capital should have similar earnings 
given ownership, industry and region. The earnings gap between workers in SOEs and other 
workers is addressed by Zhao (2002), who finds the highest earnings in foreign enterprises, 
followed by private enterprises, SOEs and then collective enterprises. More interestingly, 
Zhao (2002) finds that unskilled workers in SOEs have higher earnings than do unskilled 
workers in foreign enterprises; by contrast, skilled workers’ earnings are lower in SOEs than 
in foreign enterprises. Using data from the China Household Income Project (CHIP), Chen et 
al. (2005) find that foreign and collective enterprises are at the high and low ends of the 
earnings distribution, respectively. However, Chen et al. (2005) find that earnings are higher 
in SOEs than in private enterprises, which contradicts the finding of Zhao (2002). Chen et al. 
(2005) decompose earnings differentials across sectors with different ownership and confirm 
the existence of segmentation based on ownership. Gini coefficients of the wage distribution 
by industry of 0.055 for 1988 and 0.121 for 1997 (Li, 2003) indicate widening earnings 
differentials across industries. Regional earnings gaps can be interpreted as the result of 
differences in the extent of marketization. Li and Wang (2005) find that the earnings gap 
between workers in eastern and western regions widened slightly between 1995 and 2002. 
The earnings of workers in western regions were up to 64% and 63% higher than those of 
workers in eastern regions in 1995 and 2002. 
Our aim is to decompose earnings inequality among workers in urban China based on 
earnings functions, to quantify the effects of causal factors such as gender, experience and 
education on earnings inequality and, by comparing the decomposition results for 1988, 1995 
and 2002, to examine changes in the effects of the contributing factors. 
 
3. Regression-based Decomposition Approaches 
Decompositions of inequality indices by population groups and by income sources are 
commonly applied in the field of income distribution. However, these methods have several 
drawbacks. To begin with, before decomposition by population groups can proceed, the 
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The effect of continuous variables on income inequality cannot be directly quantified based 
decomposition by groups (Morduch and Sicular, 2002). Although artificial disaggregation 
based on continuous variables enables decomposition by groups, the threshold for each 
category lacks economic justification. Moreover, decomposition by groups based on multiple 
grouping variables is difficult because the number of cells increases and the number of 
observations within each cell decreases multiplicatively. Moreover, the grouping variables 
may not be causal factors of income inequality. Thus, decomposition by population groups 
reflects the effect on income inequality of underlying causal factors other than the grouping 
variables (Morduch and Sicular, 2002). Decomposition by income sources is also problematic. 
While the results from the decomposition indicate the contribution to income inequality of 
income components, such as wages, property income and transfer income, it cannot quantify 
the effect on income inequality of causal factors such as gender, education and experience 
(Fields, 1998). 
To overcome the drawbacks of decompositions by groups and sources, regression-based 
decomposition approaches were developed by Bourguignon et al. (2001), Fields (1998), 
Morduch and Sicular (2002) and Shorrocks (1999).
1 Although these approaches are derived 
from different starting points and are based on different regressions, all aim to estimate the 
effect of causal factors on income inequality. To facilitate understanding of our 
decomposition results, we briefly describe the decomposition approaches used in this paper. 
Morduch and Sicular (2002) combine regressions of income functions with 
decomposition by income sources. A linear income function is estimated as follows: 
01 12 2 KK yX X X β ββ β =+ + + + + " ε1, 2, , kK ,  = " , 
where y is income and the explanatory variables  include gender, education, experience, 
occupation, industry and region. 
k X
k β  are coefficients to be estimated and ε  is a disturbance 
term. Based on this income regression, the predicted income based on each causal factor is: 
k k
k x y β ˆ ˆ = . 
                                                 
1 The approach advocated by Bourguignon et al. (2001) was developed along the lines of the Blinder–Oaxaca 
decomposition, which is suitable for comparing income inequality in different states (for example, periods, 
sectors or regions). In this sense, the Bourguignon et al. (2001) approach is a comparative static approach and 
cannot be applied to analyze dynamic income inequality. In this paper, we aim to decompose earnings inequality 
in three separate years and then compare the contributions of different factors to inequality. Thus, we choose not 
to adopt the Bourguignon et al. (2001) approach. 
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c y β = ,  ˆ
r y e = , 
respectively. 
If    is treated as one income source, in the framework of Shorrocks (1982), the 
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R  component of the inequality index, with the constant term having no effect on 
inequality. 
The Shorrocks (1999) approach is based on the marginal effects of the causal factors on 
inequality, each of which measures the change in inequality after isolating a factor.
2 Because 
there are many sequences of isolating factors, the marginal effect of a particular factor is not 
unique. Shorrocks (1999) suggests taking averages of all possible marginal effects to quantify 
                                                 
1 When several assumptions are satisfied,  , where  is the inequality index,  are 
weights and N is the number of observations (Shorrocks, 1982). Replacing the sum of the subitems with total 
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2 Isolating does not mean simply deleting factors. Morduch and Sicular (2002) suggest two ways to isolate 
factors from inequality: deleting factors, and replacing the means of the factors with the factors themselves. 
  7the contribution of that factor to inequality. This approach was termed the Shapley 
decomposition, based on the Shapley value used in cooperative game theory. Wan (2004) 
extends the Shapley decomposition by explicitly taking the constant and residual terms into 
account.
1 
The regression-based decomposition approaches described above are based on different 
premises and all have advantages and disadvantages. The method developed by Fields (1998) 
only applies to the semilog income function, which decomposes the inequality implied by the 
log of income rather than income itself. Moreover, the Fields (1998) approach implies that the 
constant term has no effect on income inequality. Morduch and Sicular (2002) do not properly 
deal with the constant and residual terms in their decomposition approach either, which is 
addressed by Wan (2002, 2004). However, Wan (2002, 2004) treats the constant and residual 
terms differently from the explanatory variables. The effects of the deterministic part on 
inequality are quantified by applying the Shapley decomposition, whereas the contributions of 
the constant and residual terms are computed simply by subtracting the contributions of the 
earnings determinants from total inequality.
2 All regression-based decomposition approaches 
have problems in dealing with dummy variables. To be specific, the coefficient of the 
constant term and those of the explanatory variables are affected by the choice of the 
reference groups for the dummy variables, on which the decomposition results depend. To 
address this issue, Yue et al. (2008) advocate a standard transformation of the dummy 
variables. To implement the standardization, the coefficients of the subgroup variables are 
multiplied by the subgroup variables to obtain a summed-up variable, from which is 
subtracted its sample mean. Thus, the sample mean of the summed-up variable is included in 
the constant term, which no longer affects the decomposition results. When decomposing 
inequality by using the Fields (1998) and Wan (2004) approaches based on the semilog 
income function, there is no need to deal with the constant term. Having estimated semilog 
income functions, Wan (2004) transforms the predicted logarithmic income term to an income 
term in which the constant term is simply a multiplier of income that has no effect on 
inequality. In the Fields (1998) framework, the constant term contributes nothing to inequality. 
 
                                                 
1 See the appendix for discussion of this approach. 
2 Decomposition results obtained from the Morduch and Sicular (2002) approach could be improved by treating 
the constant and residual terms as proposed by Wan (2004). 
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The data come from the urban survey of CHIP conducted by the Institute of Economics, 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, for the reference years 1988, 1995 and 2002.
1 The 1988 
survey covers Beijing, Shanxi, Liaoning, Jiangsu, Anhui, Hunan, Hubei, Guangdong, Yunnan 
and Gansu. Sichuan was added to the sample frame in 1995. In 2002, Chongqing was 
included as a separate province, but it was included as part of Sichuan for the 1995 survey. 
The surveys cover 9009, 6931 and 6835 urban households in 1988, 1995 and 2002, 
respectively. Given our focus on earnings, we include only employed persons with complete 
information on earnings in the sample. The numbers of observations used are 16991, 10852 
and 9388 for the reference years 1988, 1995 and 2002, respectively. 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics. Earnings for 1995 and 2002 are deflated by 1988 
prices. As Table 1 shows, earnings for male workers increased by 165% between 1988 and 
2002, which is slightly more than the corresponding increase of 161% for female workers. For 
the period under study, CPC members experienced faster earnings increases than did non-
CPC members. Increases in earnings seem to be linearly correlated with education: more 
highly educated workers experienced larger increases in earnings. Whereas the earnings of 
workers without even primary education hardly changed between 1988 and 2002, the earnings 
of workers with at least a college education increased from 2314 yuan in 1988 to 7156 yuan 
in 2002. 
[Table 1 about here] 
Turning to the relationship between work experience and earnings, earnings increased 
steadily with experience in 1988. However, the earnings–experience curves are clearly U-
shaped for 1995 and 2002, similar to those of developed countries, reflecting the increased 
role of market forces in earnings determination. 
Table 1 shows that earnings differ with the ownership status of enterprises. In the three 
reference years, foreign and collective enterprises had the highest and lowest earnings levels, 
respectively. Note that, in 1988, the SOEs controlled by local governments had almost the 
same earnings levels as did SOEs controlled by the central government. However, in 1995 
and 2002, the earnings of the former were well below those of the latter, which reflects the 
increased monopoly power of SOEs controlled by the central government. 
                                                 
1 For a detailed description of the data, see Eichen and Zhang (1993), Khan and Riskin (1998) and Khan and 
Riskin (2005). 
  9Earnings differentials by occupation are of interest. Managers had the highest earnings 
in the three reference years, followed by professionals and technicians, while clerks and 
production workers had the lowest earnings. Managers, professionals and technicians also had 
the fastest growth in earnings, which increased by nearly 190% between 1988 and 2002, 
compared with the 110% increase in earnings for production workers. 
Table 1 also indicates the earnings gaps among industries. Compared with workers in 
competitive industries (such as manufacturing and catering), those in public services 
(including governments and institutions) and monopolistic industries (such as 
telecommunications, finance and insurance) have much higher earnings. Moreover, earnings 
increased faster in public services and monopolistic industries than in competitive industries. 
For instance, earnings in the finance and insurance sector increased by 234% between 1988 
and 2002, whereas those in catering only doubled in this period. 
Regional earnings gaps are widening, mainly because earnings have increased in eastern 
regions more rapidly than have those in central and western regions. Take Beijing and Gansu 
as examples. Average earnings in Beijing were almost the same as those in Gansu in 1988, 
whereas in 1995, the former were 187% higher than the latter. Earnings differentials between 
Beijing and Gansu continued to widening in 2002. Although average earnings in Beijing 
increased by 280% between 1988 and 2002, those in Gansu increased by 116% in the same 
period. 
[Table 2 about here] 
The structure of earnings has seen significant changes since wage systems in SOEs were 
reformed and since nonpublic enterprises with incentive-oriented wage schemes were 
established. Table 2 shows the change in the components of earnings. It is clear that wage 
structures were similar in 1988 and 1995. However, there was a striking change in the wage 
structure in 2002. The share of basic wages in earnings increased from 54% in 1988 to 81% in 
2002. Accordingly, the shares of bonuses and subsidies fell from 35% in 1988 to 15% in 2002. 
Incomes from private and individually owned enterprise were playing increasingly important 
roles in earnings, largely because of the increased number of workers in these enterprises, 
especially from the mid-1990s when SOEs and urban collective enterprises pursued the policy 
of laying off workers. 
[Table 3 about here] 
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According to conventional wisdom in China, earnings inequality is increasing. Table 3 
confirms this by reporting Gini coefficients for 1988, 1995 and 2002 of 0.235, 0.302 and 
0.342, respectively. The Lorenz curves presented in Figure 2 straightforwardly illustrate 
increasing earnings inequality. The decomposition of earnings inequality by source quantifies 
the contribution of different components of earnings to inequality. Coupled with the increase 
in inequality itself and given its share in earnings, the contribution of basic wages to earnings 
inequality doubled between 1988 and 2002. Bonus payments also contributed to earnings 
inequality but to a lesser extent. In 1988, subsidies helped to mitigate earnings inequality but 
exacerbated earnings inequality in 1995 and 2002. While income from private and 
individually owned enterprises increased earnings inequality in 1988, it reduced inequality in 
1995 and 2002. The concentration ratios of income from private and individually owned 
enterprises are 0.691, 0.266 and –0.063 for 1988, 1995 and 2002, respectively. 
 
5. Earnings Functions 
To decompose inequality indices following Fields (1998), Morduch and Sicular (2002) 
and Shorrocks (1999), a linear or semilog earning function must be estimated. Table 4 and the 
appendix table provide estimates of earnings functions. Subject to limitations on space, we 
only discuss the regression results in Table 4. 
[Table 4 about here] 
The estimated semilog earnings function largely confirms the message of the descriptive 
statistics. After standardization, there is still a widening gender earnings gap. Male workers 
earned 10% more than did their female counterparts in 1988, but the gap was 14% in 2002. 
CPC members have increasingly higher earnings than do non-CPC members. After 
controlling for several characteristics, rates of returns to education increased from 2.6% in 
1988 to 4.7% in 2002. This result is consistent with the findings of Li and Ding (2003) and 
Zhang and Zhao (2002) and suggests the gradual marketization of wage determination. 
Supporting this, the coefficients of work experience and its squared term suggest an age–
earnings profile that has an inverted U-shape. That is, earnings increase with age, then peak 
and thereafter decline. 
  11Turning to ownership, foreign enterprises have the highest earnings levels, followed by 
SOEs controlled by central and local governments. It is worth noting that the earnings gap 
between the two types of SOEs widened in the later period of reform, perhaps because of their 
different performance levels and degrees of monopoly. In 1988, workers from private and 
individually owned enterprises had significantly lower earnings than those from the reference 
group, collective enterprises. However, for 1995 and 2002, there was no earnings differential 
between these two kinds of enterprises. 
Occupation also affects earnings significantly. Unskilled workers are among the lowest 
earners in all three years. Clearly, managers, professionals and technicians are at the top of the 
earnings distribution, followed by clerks. Compared with those of production workers, the 
relative earnings of professionals and technicians, managers and office workers experienced 
steady increases. 
The industry dummy variables are strong predictors of earnings. Compared with most 
other industries, manufacturing, the reference group, had relatively high earnings in 1988. 
However, in 1995 and 2002, relative earnings in manufacturing fell, suggesting lower demand 
for its products. In brief, competitive industries (such as manufacturing and catering) paid 
lower earnings, whereas industries with monopoly power (such as telecommunications) paid 
higher earnings. 
There are regional gaps in earnings following standardization. Beijing and Guangdong 
have the highest earnings. In provinces in the eastern region, such as Jiangsu, earnings are 
higher than in provinces in the central and western regions, such as Henan and Gansu. A 
matter of concern is that earnings differentials between Beijing, the reference group, and 
provinces in economically backward regions are widening. For instance, earnings in Gansu 
were 11%, 54% and 68% lower than in Beijing in 1988, 1995 and 2002, respectively. 
 
6. Decompositions of Earnings Inequality 
Having estimated linear and semilog earnings functions, we decomposed earnings 
inequality by using the methods developed by Fields (1998), Morduch and Sicular (2002) and 
Shorrocks (1999). The results are reported in Tables 5–11. Table 5 presents decomposition 
results for inequality in logarithmic earnings, following Fields (1998). Decomposition results 
of earnings inequality based on the approach advocated by Morduch and Sicular (2002) are 
  12given in Tables 6–8.
1 When applying the Shorrocks (1999) approach, predicted logarithmic 
earnings computed from the semilog earnings function are converted into predicted earnings 
by taking the antilog. Thus, the decomposition relates to earnings inequality (rather than 
logarithmic earnings inequality), and the constant term is simply a multiplier that makes no 
contribution to earnings inequality. Tables 9–11 report the decomposition results based on the 
Shorrocks (1999) approach. 
[Tables 5–11 about here] 
As discussed in Section 3, the three approaches to decomposition do not necessarily 
yield similar results. However, it is reassuring that the decompositions reported in Tables 5–
11 are similar and all convey a similar message. The contribution of gender to earnings 
inequality remained relatively unchanged over the period spanned by the three reference years. 
Although this does not mean that gender made a negligible contribution to earnings inequality, 
it suggests that other factors made larger contributions. Although the earnings gap between 
CPC and non-CPC members is widening, the contribution of CPC membership to earnings 
inequality remained stable over the period. 
Work experience played a decreasing role in earnings inequality. In Tables 9–11, the 
contribution of work experience to the Gini coefficient of earnings decreased from 27.1% in 
1988 to 13.9% in 1995 and to 5.7% in 2002. In fact, work experience dominates the 
distribution of earnings for 1988. A possible explanation is that work experience had a strong 
effect on earnings while other factors such as gender, education and occupation had relatively 
small effects on earnings (Knight and Song, 1994). Although earnings differentials among 
workers with different levels of work experience are not large in absolute terms, work 
experience did make a significant contribution to inequality in the earnings distribution under 
the planned economy, given the relatively even distribution of earnings in that period.
2 
Unlike work experience, education played an increasingly important role in earnings 
inequality. As Tables 9–10 indicate, the contributions of education to the Gini coefficients of 
earnings are 5.8%, 6.3% and 10.6% for 1988, 1995 and 2002, respectively. The increasingly 
important role of education suggests a greater role for market forces in the determination of 
                                                 
1 Dummy variables are dealt with by following Yue et al. (2008), so that the decomposition results in Tables 6–8 
are not affected by the choice of the reference groups. 
2 Gustafsson et al. (2003) reached a similar conclusion, suggesting that the wage system in China put more 
weight on work experience than did that of the former USSR. 
  13earnings. Thus, through the process of marketization, individual characteristics that enhance 
productivity received higher returns.
1 
Ownership status, occupation and industry had increasing effects on earnings inequality, 
partly because of the reform of wage schemes. Of these three variables, ownership contributed 
most to earnings inequality, followed by occupation and then industry. However, the 
differences between these contributions decreased. The rapid development of private, 
individually owned and foreign enterprises in the early period of reform accounted for much 
of the increase in earnings inequality, although nonpublic enterprises were rare at that time. 
As SOE reforms progressed and efficiency-based wage schemes became predominant, the 
contribution of ownership status to earnings inequality declined. Similarly, the increasing role 
of industry in explaining earnings inequality may reflect the tightening of budget constraints. 
When SOEs were the dominant form of enterprise, they paid earnings that were independent 
of industry profitability. SOEs in low-profitability industries received subsidies to enable 
them to maintain a certain level of earnings, and SOEs in high-profitability industries were 
only allowed to vary earnings within certain limits. Following the tightening of SOE budget 
constraints and the expansion of nonpublic enterprises, earnings related more closely to firm 
performance. Thus, because industry influences earnings through profitability, it follows that 
industry has a greater effect on earnings inequality. 
The provincial dummy variables were (after work experience) the second most 
important contributor to earnings inequality in 1988. In 1995 and 2002, provincial dummies 
were the most important contributor. The changing role of the provinces reflects provincial 
differences in economic performance and the process of marketization and implies the 
emergence of labor market segregation (Knight et al., 2001; Li and Wang, 2005). Increased 
worker mobility between regions can be expected to reduce earnings inequality in urban 
China. 
 
7. Concluding Remarks 
Earnings inequality in urban China is increasing. To explain this, in this paper, using 
household survey data from the China Household Income Project for the reference years 1988, 
1995 and 2002, we decomposed earnings inequality by applying the methods developed by 
Fields (1998), Morduch and Sicular (2002) and Shorrocks (1999). 
                                                 
1 The distribution of schooling remained relatively unchanged across the three reference years. According to our 
computations, the Gini coefficients of schooling are 0.1462, 0.1511 and 0.1422 for 1988, 1995 and 2002, 
respectively. 
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Our decomposition results suggest that the contributions of gender and membership of 
the Communist Party of China to earnings inequality remained fairly stable over the period 
spanned by the reference years. Work experience made the greatest contribution to earnings 
inequality in 1988, but this contribution diminished greatly in 1995 and 2002. At the same 
time, education differences made an increasingly important contribution to earnings 
inequality. Occupational differences also explain rising earnings inequality. The changing 
roles of work experience, education and occupation imply that personal characteristics 
associated with higher productivity were better rewarded following the reform of wage 
systems, which increased incentives for workers and promoted economic growth through 
enhanced efficiency. 
Because the urban labor market remains in its infancy, segmentation persists. Barriers to 
labor mobility between enterprises of different ownership status, industries and regions 
remain, which is to blame for rising earnings inequality. 
Earnings inequality caused by labor market segmentation is a form of unfair inequality, 
which requires policy measures. Although ownership status, industry and region are all 
segmentation factors, they have different effects on earnings inequality, as discussed above. 
Thus, policies designed to lower earnings inequality by reducing segmentation should be 
prioritized. Because regional effects are currently the largest contributor to earnings inequality, 
attenuating regional segmentation is the most effective way to reduce earnings inequality. 
Regulating industries that have monopoly power by restricting their scope to raise earnings 
would also help to reduce earnings inequality. By reducing segmentation, these policy 
measures can be expected to enhance efficiency as well as increase earnings equality. 
References 
Bourguignon, François, Martin Fournier and Marc Gurgand, 2001, Fast Development with a 
Stable Income Distribution: Taiwan, 1979–94, Review of Income and Wealth, Vol. 47, No. 
2, June, pp. 139–163. 
Chen, Yi, Sylvie Démurger and Martin Fournier, 2005, Earnings Differentials and Ownership 
Structure in Chinese Enterprises, Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 53, 
No. 4, July, pp. 933–958. 
Démurger, Sylvie, Martin Fournier, Shi Li and Zhong Wei, 2006, Economic Liberalization 
with Rising Segmentation in China’s Urban Labor Market, Asian Economic Papers, Vol. 5, 
No. 3, pp. 58–101. 
Démurger, Sylvie, Martin Fournier and Yi Chen, 2007, The Evolution of Gender Wage Gaps 
and Discrimination in Urban China: 1988–95, The Developing Economies, Vol. 45, Issue 1, 
pp. 97–121. 
Eichen, Marc and Ming Zhang, 1993, The 1988 Household Sample Survey – Data 
Description and Availability, in Keith Griffin and Renwei Zhao (eds.), The Distribution of 
Income in China, pp. 331–346, London: Macmillan Press. 
Fields, Gary, 1998, Accounting for Differences in Income Inequality, mimeo, Cornell 
University. 
Gustafsson, Björn and Shi Li, 2001, The Anatomy of Rising Earnings Inequality in Urban 
China, Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol. 29, pp. 118–135. 
Gustafsson, Björn and Shi Li, 2000, Economic Transformation and the Gender Earnings Gap 
in Urban China, Journal of Population Economics, Vol. 13, pp. 305–329. 
Gustafsson, Björn, Shi Li, Ludmila Nivorozhkina and Katerina Katz, 2003, Rubles and Yuan: 
Wage Functions for Urban China and Russia at the End of the 80s, Economic Development 
and Cultural Change, Vol. 50, No. 1, pp. 1–17. 
Juhn, Chinhui, Kevin Murphy and Brooks Pierce, 1991, Accounting for the Slowdown in 
Black–White Wage Convergence, in Marvin Kosters (ed.), Workers and Their Wages: 
Changing Patterns in the United States, Washington: American Enterprise Institute Press, 
pp. 107–143. 
Khan, Aziz and Carl Riskin, 2005, Household Income and its Distribution in China, 1995 and 
2002, China Quarterly, Vol. 182, pp. 356–384. 
  16Khan, Azizur, R. and Carl Riskin, 1998, Income Inequality in China: Composition, 
Distribution and Growth of Household Income, 1988 to 1995, China Quarterly, Vol. 154, 
pp. 221–253. 
Knight, John and Lina Song, 1994, Why Urban Wages Differ in China, in Keith Griffin and 
Renwei Zhao (eds.), The Distribution of Income in China, pp. 216–284, London: 
Macmillan Press. 
Knight, John and Lina Song, 2003, Increasing Urban Wage Inequality in China: Extent, 
Elements and Evaluation, Economics of Transition, Vol. 11, No. 4, pp. 597–619. 
Knight, John and Lina Song, 2008, China’s Emerging Urban Wage Structure, 1995–2002, in 
Björn Gustafsson, Shi Li and Terry Sicular (eds.), Inequality and Public Policy in China, 
pp. 221–242, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Knight, John and Linda Yueh, 2006, Job Mobility of Residents and Migrants in Urban China, 
in Shi Li and Hiroshi Sato (eds.), Unemployment, Inequality, and Poverty in Urban China, 
pp. 236–260, London: Routledge. 
Knight, John, Shi Li and Renwei Zhao, 2001, A Spatial Analysis of Wages and Incomes in 
Urban China: Divergent Means, Convergent Inequality, in Carl Riskin, Renwei Zhao and 
Shi Li (eds.), China’s Retreat from Equality: Income Distribution and Economic 
Transition, pp. 133–166, New York: M.E. Sharpe. 
Lai, Desheng, 1999, Education, Labor Markets and Income Distribution, in Renwei Zhao and 
Keith Griffin (eds.), Research on Household Income Distribution in China, pp. 451–474, 
Beijing: Publishing House of Chinese Social Sciences, in Chinese. 
Li, Shi, 2003, Literature Review on Income Distribution in China: Retrospect and Prospect, 
Economics (Quarterly), Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 379–404, in Chinese. 
Li, Shi and Björn Gustafsson, 2008, Unemployment, Earlier Retirement and Changes in the 
Gender Income Gap in Urban China, 1995–2002, in Björn Gustafsson, Shi Li and Terry 
Sicular (eds.), Inequality and Public Policy, pp. 242–266, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Li, Shi and Sai Ding, 2003, Changes in Returns to Education in Urban China, China Social 
Sciences, No. 6, pp. 58–72, in Chinese. 
Li, Shi and Travers, Lee, 1994, Estimates of Returns to Education in China, in Renwei Zhao 
and Keith Griffin (eds.), Research on Household Income Distribution in China, Beijing: 
Publishing House of Chinese Social Sciences, in Chinese. 
Li, Shi and Yake Wang, 2005, Empirical Analysis of the Earnings Gap between Eastern and 
Western Regions in China, Management World, No. 6, pp. 16–26, in Chinese. 
  17  18
Li, Shi and Zhao, Yaohui, 2003, The Decline of In-kind Wage Payments in Urban China, 
Journal of Chinese Economic and Business Studies, Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 245–258. 
Liu, Pak-Wai, Xin Meng and Junsen Zhang, 2000, Sectoral Gender Wage Differentials and 
Discrimination in the Transitional Chinese Economy, Journal of Population Economics, 
Vol. 13, Issue 2, pp. 331–352. 
Meng, Xin and Michael P. Kidd, 1997, Labor Market Reform and the Changing Structure of 
Wage Determination in China’s State Sector during the 1980s, Journal of Comparative 
Economics, Vol. 25, Issue 3, pp. 403–421. 
Morduch, Jonathan and Terry Sicular, 2002, Rethinking Inequality Decomposition, with 
Evidence from Rural China, Economic Journal, Vol. 112, pp. 93–106. 
National Bureau of Statistics, 2005, China Statistical Yearbook, Beijing: China Statistical 
Press. 
Shorrocks, Anthony. F., 1982, Inequality Decomposition by Factor Components, 
Econometrica, Vol. 50, No. 1, pp. 193–201. 
Shorrocks, Anthony. F., 1999, Decomposition Procedures for Distributional Analysis: A 
Unified Framework Based on the Shapley Value, unpublished manuscript, Department of 
Economics, University of Essex. 
Wan, Guanghua, 2002, Regression-based Inequality Decomposition: Pitfalls and a Solution 
Procedure, WIDER Discussion Paper No. 2002/101, UNU–WIDER. 
Wan, Guanghua, 2004, Accounting for Income Inequality in Rural China: A Regression-
based Approach, Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol. 32, Issue 2, pp. 348–363. 
Yue, Ximing, Terry Sicular, Shi Li and Björn Gustafsson, 2008, Explaining Incomes and 
Inequality in China, in Björn Gustafsson, Shi Li and Terry Sicular (eds.), Inequality and 
Public Policy, pp. 88–117, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Yueh, Linda, 2004, Wage Reforms in China during the 1990s, Asian Economic Journal, Vol. 
18, No. 2, pp. 149–164. 
Zhang, Junsen and Yaohui Zhao, 2002, Economic Returns to Schooling in Urban China, 
1988–1999, presented at the 5th Annual NBER-CCER Conference, June 30–July 2, 
Beijing, 2002. 
Zhao, Yaohui, 2002, Earnings Differentials between State and Non-state Enterprises in Urban 
China, Pacific Economic Review, Vol. 7, No. 1, pp. 181–197. Figure 1. Number of workers in state-owned units as a percentage of all workers in 
urban China 
 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics (2005) 
 












0 1 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0 1 0 0










































  19Table 1. Descriptive statistics  













Male  52.57 1989.08  52.85 2991.71  55.63 5263.98 
Female  47.43 1656.20  47.15 2489.81  44.37 4322.05 
          
CPC  members  24.20 2217.41  25.22 3361.82  29.87 5960.70 
Non-CPC  members  75.80 1707.89  74.78 2550.41  70.13 4371.40 
          
Education          
College and above   6.34  2313.59  7.86  3567.43  10.76  7155.70 
Poly-tech  college  6.85 1964.79  15.60 3150.51  23.65 5553.30 
Senior  middle  school 35.77 1788.62  41.29 2701.95  40.71 4521.37 
Junior  middle  school 38.73 1764.59  30.10 2495.67  22.38 3768.85 
Primary  school  10.31 1873.31 4.86 2291.76 2.35 3214.74 
Below  primary    2.00 1677.04 0.29 1717.16 0.16 1920.20 
          
Work experience          
≤ 10  20.40 1260.67  16.46 2091.26  13.54 4185.68 
11–20  28.13 1795.89  27.00 2611.60  25.55 4843.04 
21–30  31.39 2029.97  36.73 3010.93  34.75 4892.11 
31–40  16.28 2155.77  16.96 3104.03  22.98 5176.38 
≥ 41  3.79 2123.01 2.86 2573.77 3.18 4793.11 
          
Ownership          
Central  SOEs  39.07 1988.00  26.86 3119.12  45.88 5610.94 
Local  SOEs  39.49 1821.65  55.10 2734.24  20.23 4399.11 
Collective  enterprises 20.46 1543.01  15.55 2139.22 7.32 3317.16 
Private and 
individually owned 
0.22 1886.30 0.73 2446.97 9.66 3422.19 
Foreign  enterprises  0.35 2842.11 1.27 3733.04 2.36 6377.01 
Other  0.41 1297.23 0.50 2598.00  14.55 4521.50 
          
Occupation          
Professionals and 
technicians  
16.31 2055.15  22.59 3171.05  22.48 5911.17 
Managers    6.72 2329.19  11.82 3503.71  11.21 6710.60 
Clerks  23.91 1917.90  21.25 2717.59  21.33 5041.38 
Production  workers  52.99 1660.46  39.14 2382.05  42.72 3786.03 
Other  0.08 1539.59 5.20 2205.42 2.27 3213.04 
          
Industry          
Agriculture, forestry, 
husbandry, fishing 
0.99 1775.77 1.70 2978.54 1.27 4689.13 
Manufacturing  43.09 1759.41  41.54 2573.42  26.52 4120.44 
Mining and geological 
prospecting 
3.98 1812.64 1.03 2821.70 5.90 5055.93 




6.83 2014.41 5.10 3055.29 7.88 5232.06 
Commerce, trade, 
restaurants and catering
14.16 1835.05  14.43 2439.18  10.15 3670.67 
Real estate, public 
utilities 
2.34 1656.86 3.90 2835.09  10.68 3980.85 
  20Health, physical culture 
and social welfare 
4.68 1890.45 4.68 3123.53 5.35 5723.72 
Education, culture and 
arts 
7.45 1966.36 7.34 3105.26 9.58 6100.73 
Scientific research and 
technical services 
2.10 2051.26 2.45 3275.42 1.86 7371.91 
Finance,  insurance  1.57 1740.75 2.02 3202.14 2.82 5817.56 
Government and party 
organs, social 
organizations 
8.63 1940.99  12.15 3007.03  12.62 5750.52 
Other  0.72 1460.35 0.75 2765.35 2.00 4583.41 
          
Provinces          
Beijing  4.56 1926.75 6.81 3775.81 8.76 7319.96 
Shanxi  10.70 1617.28 9.68 2156.52 8.52 4022.53 
Liaoning  10.94 1770.78  10.83 2468.19  10.85 4371.26 
Jiangsu  13.38 1730.01  10.89 3015.38 9.92 5009.34 
Anhui  9.75 1682.58 7.26 2175.52 6.76 4209.36 
Henan  11.28 1488.41 8.53 2086.65 9.20 3517.45 
Hubei  11.07 1731.26  10.24 2614.36  10.17 4183.16 
Guangdong  11.77 2652.49 8.67 4921.44 9.26 7544.94 
Sichuan  – –  – –  4.21  5022.60 
Chongqing  –  –  11.79 2573.27 8.04 4096.86 
Yunnan  10.30 1908.93 9.77 2542.48 8.70 4596.88 
Gansu  6.24 1802.23 5.53 2013.80 5.60 3889.45 
          
Work experience    20.79    21.77    23.05 
Work experience squared   553.36    579.02    638.25 
Schooling    10.50    10.77    11.53 
           
Earnings  (yuan)   1831.19   2755.05    4846.09 
Logarithmic  earnings   7.41   7.74   8.27 
          
Observations   16691   10852    9388 
Note: earnings are in 1988 prices. 
  21Table 2. The structure of earnings 
  1988  1995  2002  












Basic  wage  54.45  997.08  58.23 1604.16  81.37 3943.04 
Bonus  18.92 346.55  15.23 419.50  9.26 448.90 
Subsidy  16.51 302.40  16.58 456.80  6.03 292.07 
Income from 
operations  0.12  2.16  0.54 14.83  1.17 56.76 
Other  9.99 183.00  9.43 259.76  2.17 105.33 






Table 3. Decomposition of earnings inequality by source 
  1988  1995  2002  













wage  0.1571  36.34 0.2219  42.75 0.3071  73.12 
Bonus  0.4091  32.89 0.5242  26.40 0.5791  15.70 




0.6914 0.35  0.2664 0.47 –0.0634  –0.22 
Other  0.3857  16.37 0.4016  12.53 0.3175  2.02 
          
Gini  0.2354  100 0.3023  100 0.3418  100 
  22Table 4. Estimated earnings functions 
Logarithmic earnings  1988  1995  2002 
Male  0.095  *** 0.144  *** 0.138  *** 
CPC  0.061  *** 0.079  *** 0.084  *** 
Work  experience  0.042  *** 0.068  *** 0.030  *** 
Work  experience  squared  –0.001 *** –0.001 *** –0.0004  *** 
Schooling  0.026  *** 0.027  *** 0.047  *** 
           
Central  SOEs  0.189  *** 0.362  *** 0.326  *** 
Local  SOEs  0.107  *** 0.184  *** 0.168  *** 
Collective  enterprises  –   –   –   
Private and individually owned 
enterprises  –0.244  *** 0.028   0.037   
Foreign  enterprises  0.301  *** 0.444  *** 0.462  *** 
Other  –0.298  *** 0.114   0.222  *** 
           
Professionals  and  technicians  0.071  *** 0.186  *** 0.209  *** 
Managers  0.099  *** 0.179  *** 0.232  *** 
Clerks  0.050  *** 0.089  *** 0.121  *** 
Production  workers  –   –   –   
Other 0.057   –0.020   –0.253  *** 
             
Agriculture, forestry, husbandry, 
fishing  –0.035   –0.055   0.049  
Manufacturing  –   –   –   
Mining and geological 
prospecting  0.041 *** –0.006    0.181 *** 
Construction  0.007   0.024   0.019   
Transportation, post and 
telecommunications  0.009   0.071  *** 0.152  *** 
Commerce, trade, restaurants 
and catering  –0.013   –0.058 *** –0.121 *** 
Real  estate,  public  utilities  –0.093 *** –0.047   –0.097 *** 
Health, physical culture and 
social welfare  –0.045  *** 0.069 ** 0.125  *** 
Education, culture and arts  –0.049  ***  0.062  ***  0.130  *** 
Scientific research and technical 
services  –0.032  * 0.042   0.193  *** 
Finance,  insurance  –0.069  *** 0.180  *** 0.139  *** 
Government and party organs, 
social organizations  –0.088 *** –0.003    0.057  ** 
Other  –0.188 *** –0.137  ** –0.029   
           
Beijing  –   –   –   
Shanxi  –0.215 *** –0.503 *** –0.640 *** 
Liaoning  –0.019   –0.349 *** –0.477 *** 
Jiangsu  –0.008   –0.086 *** –0.365 *** 
Anhui  –0.108 *** –0.443 *** –0.568 *** 
Henan  –0.241 *** –0.512 *** –0.707 *** 
Hubei  –0.091 *** –0.295 *** –0.561 *** 
Guangdong  0.289  *** 0.330  *** 0.032   
Sichuan  N.A.   –0.301 *** –0.430 *** 
Chongqing  N.A.    N.A.   –0.529 *** 
Yunnan  0.010   –0.334 *** –0.474 *** 
Gansu  –0.109 *** –0.544 *** –0.677 *** 
           
  23Constant 6.447  *** 6.634  *** 7.280  *** 
           
Adj. R
2  0.4338   0.3219   0.3673   
F-Value  366.39   144.07   148.28   
Observations 16691   10852   9388   
Note: ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
          N.A.  indicates that the province was not surveyed. 
  24Table 5. Decompositions of earnings inequality based on the Fields (1998) approach 
  1988 1995 2002 
Male 0.0219  0.0163  0.016 
CPC 0.0163  0.0102  0.0136 
Work experience  0.2157  0.0807  0.0243 
Schooling 0.0167  0.0218  0.0563 
Ownership 0.0403  0.0363  0.0545 
Occupation 0.0213  0.0309  0.0543 
Industry –0.0016  0.0083  0.0381 
Province 0.1045  0.1196  0.1129 
Residual 0.5650  0.6759  0.6302 
      




Table 6. Decompositions of earnings inequality based on the Morduch and Sicular approach for 1988 
 Gini  (%)  Theil  (%)  CV
2 (%) 
Male  0.0064 2.72  –0.0006  –0.54 0.0043 1.44 
CPC  0.0067 2.83 0.0026 2.45 0.0044 1.48 
Work  experience  0.0469 19.91 –0.0077 –7.24  0.0290  9.74 
Schooling  0.0044 1.88  –0.0228  –21.54 0.0031 1.04 
Ownership  0.0085 3.59 0.0063 5.97 0.0061 2.07 
Occupation  0.0048 2.02 0.0034 3.18 0.0030 0.99 
Industry  –0.0008 –0.33 –0.0005 –0.46 –0.0003 –0.10 
Province  0.0323 13.73  0.0247 23.38  0.0304 10.23 
Constant  0 0  –0.0245  –23.14  0 0 
Residual  0.1263  53.66 0.1247  117.94 0.2175  73.10 
          
Total  0.2354 100  0.1057 100  0.2975 100 
  25Table 7. Decompositions of earnings inequality based on the Morduch and Sicular approach for 1995 
 Gini  (%)  Theil  (%)  CV
2 (%) 
Male  0.0051 1.70  –0.0045  –2.81 0.0047 1.23 
CPC  0.0047 1.55 0.0011 0.68 0.0041 1.09 
Work  experience  0.0222 7.34  –0.0616  –38.43 0.0177 4.69 
Schooling  0.0091 3.00  –0.0420  –26.19 0.0080 2.13 
Ownership  0.0144 4.75 0.0141 8.78 0.0116 3.07 
Occupation  0.0108 3.58 0.0112 6.99 0.0094 2.49 
Industry  0.0033 1.09 0.0031 1.91 0.0033 0.86 
Province  0.0656 21.71  0.0663 41.40  0.0834 22.05 
Constant  0 0  –0.0321  –20.03  0 0 
Residual  0.1671  55.28 0.2046  127.70 0.2359  62.39 
          




Table 8. Decompositions of earnings inequality based on the Morduch and Sicular approach for 2002 
 Gini  (%)  Theil  (%)  CV
2 (%) 
Male  0.0057 1.68  –0.0076  –3.75 0.0057 1.12 
CPC  0.0053 1.55 0.0010 0.51 0.0053 1.05 
Work  experience  0.0076 2.24  –0.0645  –31.95 0.0069 1.36 
Schooling  0.0237 6.94  –0.0867  –42.95 0.0251 4.96 
Ownership  0.0156 4.55 0.0169 8.37 0.0143 2.82 
Occupation  0.0226 6.60 0.0252  12.50 0.0235 4.65 
Industry  0.0155 4.54 0.0169 8.36 0.0148 2.92 
Province  0.0516 15.11  0.0591 29.30  0.0688 13.59 
Constant  0 0  –0.0076  –3.75  0 0 
Residual  0.1942  56.81 0.2490  123.37 0.3416  67.52 
          
Total  0.3418 100  0.2019 100  0.5059 100 
  26Table 9. Decompositions of earnings inequality based on the Shorrocks approach for 1988 
  Gini  % Atkinson %  Theil  %  MLD  %  GE(2)  % 
Male  0.0103 4.39 0.0022 2.28 0.0022 2.12 0.0022 2.22 0.0023 1.58
CPC  0.0063 2.67 0.0016 1.67 0.0016 1.55 0.0016 1.64 0.0017 1.14
Work 
experience  0.0638 27.08  0.0199 20.84 0.0189 17.85 0.0204 20.25  0.0182 12.26
Schooling  0.0137 5.82 0.0019 2.01 0.0022 2.07 0.0019 1.93 0.0025 1.68
Ownership  0.0170 7.20 0.0039 4.08 0.0039 3.68 0.0040 3.97 0.0040 2.68
Occupation 0.0089 3.80 0.0021 2.22 0.0022 2.06 0.0022 2.17 0.0023 1.54
Industry  0.0019  0.80 –0.0002 –0.20 –0.0002 –0.23 –0.0002 –0.21 –0.0003 –0.19
Province  0.0412 17.49  0.0109 11.37 0.0116 10.98 0.0111 11.05  0.0126 8.50
Residual  0.0724 30.75  0.0533 55.74 0.0633 59.91 0.0573 56.97  0.1053 70.81
                 
Total  0.2354  100 0.0957  100 0.1057 100 0.1006  100 0.1487 100 
 
 
Table 10. Decompositions of earnings inequality based on the Shorrocks approach for 1995 
  Gini  % Atkinson %  Theil  %  MLD  %  GE(2)  % 
Male  0.0137 4.52 0.0036 2.17 0.0037 2.33 0.0038 2.06 0.0040 2.10
CPC  0.0075 2.48 0.0023 1.39 0.0025 1.56 0.0025 1.34 0.0028 1.48
Work 
experience  0.0421  13.94 0.0164 9.78 0.0152 9.49 0.0170 9.26 0.0147 7.80
Schooling  0.0189 6.25 0.0051 3.03 0.0054 3.38 0.0053 2.88 0.0060 3.16
Ownership  0.0273 9.04 0.0080 4.76 0.0080 5.00 0.0083 4.51 0.0083 4.37
Occupation 0.0223 7.36 0.0069 4.09 0.0070 4.40 0.0072 3.90 0.0075 3.98
Industry  0.0079 2.62 0.0019 1.11 0.0019 1.21 0.0019 1.05 0.0021 1.12
Province  0.0784 25.92  0.0297 17.68 0.0334 20.86 0.0308 16.75  0.0388 20.50
Residual  0.0843 27.87  0.0941 55.99 0.0829 51.76 0.1071 58.24  0.1049 55.48
                 
Total  0.3023  100 0.1681  100 0.1602 100 0.1840  100 0.1891 100 
 
 
Table 11. Decompositions of earnings inequality based on the Shorrocks approach for 2002 
  Gini  % Atkinson %  Theil  %  MLD  %  GE(2)  % 
Male  0.0119 3.49 0.0035 1.82 0.0035 1.74 0.0037 1.71 0.0037 1.46
CPC  0.0088 2.59 0.0031 1.60 0.0032 1.60 0.0032 1.52 0.0035 1.40
Work 
experience  0.0196 5.73 0.0053 2.78 0.0053 2.62 0.0055 2.58 0.0055 2.16
Schooling  0.0364  10.64 0.0128 6.64 0.0133 6.58 0.0133 6.26 0.0143 5.66
Ownership  0.0315 9.20 0.0117 6.08 0.0115 5.71 0.0122 5.74 0.0118 4.66
Occupation 0.0321 9.38 0.0120 6.24 0.0122 6.05 0.0126 5.89 0.0129 5.12
Industry  0.0239 7.00 0.0082 4.25 0.0081 4.00 0.0086 4.01 0.0083 3.29
Province  0.0705 20.62  0.0277 14.41 0.0309 15.29 0.0288 13.51  0.0354 14.00
Residual  0.1071 31.34  0.1079 56.18 0.1138 56.39 0.1254 58.77  0.1575 62.24
                 
Total  0.3418  100 0.1921  100 0.2019 100 0.2133  100 0.2530 100 




1988 1995 2002 
Male  172.576 *** 283.016 *** 574.109 ***
CPC  158.017 *** 204.248 *** 373.280 ***
Work  experience  56.136 *** 108.397 *** 110.242 ***
Work experience squared  –0.695  *** –1.844  ***  –1.350  ***
Schooling 45.161  *** 72.543  ***  222.327  ***
        
Central  SOEs  291.750 *** 808.006 ***  1172.673 ***
Local  SOEs  130.452 *** 352.637 *** 553.349 ***
Collective enterprises  –  –    – 
Private and individually owned 
enterprises  277.528 * –95.281    457.293  ***
Foreign  enterprises  759.819 *** 1031.010 ***  2162.845 ***
Other –245.151  ** 0.207    879.634  ***
        
Professionals  and  technicians  104.697 *** 364.310 *** 937.210 ***
Managers  151.559 *** 420.095 ***  1314.598 ***
Clerks  51.782 *** 117.870 *** 375.382 ***
Production workers  –  –    – 
Other 210.412  –34.352    –1005.874  ***
         
Agriculture, forestry, husbandry, 
fishing  –121.649 * 101.419    34.333 
Manufacturing –  –    – 
Mining and geological prospecting  54.633  29.308    915.778  ***
Construction  –3.595  190.509 **  442.275 **
Transportation, post and 
telecommunications  40.213  278.462 *** 803.048 ***
Commerce, trade, restaurants and 
catering  5.257 –61.650    –229.027  **
Real estate, public utilities  –141.683  *** 146.905  **  –265.360  **
Health, physical culture and social 
welfare  –104.825 *** 204.081 *** 718.480 ***
Education, culture and arts  –95.100  *** 115.818  **  784.372  ***
Scientific research and technical 
services  –59.085 123.552    1406.311  ***
Finance,  insurance  –164.575 *** 611.720 *** 822.809 ***
Government and party organs, social 
organizations  –172.553 *** 90.088  * 324.469 ***
Other –320.889  *** 90.048    –33.175 
        
Beijing –  –    – 
Shanxi  –292.313 *** –1387.826 ***  –3334.356 ***
Liaoning  –63.270  * –1070.081 ***  –2417.203 ***
Jiangsu –29.579  –405.152  ***  –1920.400  ***
Anhui  –130.781 *** –1292.983 ***  –2999.184 ***
Henan  –374.368 *** –1391.618 ***  –3554.749 ***
Hubei –160.829  *** –984.309  ***  –3042.587  ***
Guangdong  784.976 *** 1466.080 *** 546.562 ***
Sichuan N.A.  –975.711  ***  –2159.894  ***
Chongqing N.A.  N.A.    –2719.101  ***
Yunnan  40.049  –1098.583 ***  –2713.010 ***
Gansu  –111.142 *** –1548.299 ***  –3273.027 ***
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Constant 295.267  *** 626.684  ***  854.399  **
        
Adj. R
2 0.2674 0.3741   0.3221
F-Value 175.07  181.14    121.53 
Obs. 16691  10852    9388 
Note: ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
  29Appendix. Brief introduction to the Shapley decomposition 
We use a simple case to explain the Shapley decomposition. Suppose that we have two 
factors, A and B, that affect income inequality. I(A, B) measures inequality caused by A and 
B together, while I(A) and I(B) denote the contributions of A and B to total income inequality, 
respectively. I(Φ) represents income inequality when both A and B have no effect on 
inequality. In this case, I(Φ) = 0. 
Appendix Figure. The Shapley decomposition 
 








 I(Φ) = 0 
 
As suggested by the appendix figure, the marginal effect of A on income inequality can 
be obtained through two sequences; that is, [I(A, B) – I(B)] and [I(A) – I(Φ)]. Taking the 
average, the contribution of A to total income inequality is [I(A, B) – I(B) + I(A) – I(Φ)]/2. 
Likewise, the contribution of B to total income inequality is [I(A, B) – I(A) + I(B) – I(Φ)]/2. 
If there are m factors, each factor will have m! (factorial) marginal effects, the average of 
which yields the contribution of each factor to inequality. 
Based on the Shapley decomposition, Wan (2004) investigates the residual and constant 
terms more closely. Wan (2004) proposes the following expressions for computing the 
contributions of the constant and residual terms to inequality. 
I(Residual) = I(Constant, Residual, Causal effects) – I(Constant, Causal effects) 
I(Constant) = I(Constant, Causal effects) – I(Causal effects) 
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